Abstract. In this paper, we describe the design of a new family of block ciphers based on a Lai-Massey scheme, named FOX. The main features of this design, besides a very high security level, are a large implementation flexibility on various platforms as well as high performances. In addition, we propose a new design of strong and efficient key-schedule algorithms. We provide evidence that FOX is immune to linear and differential cryptanalysis, and we discuss its security towards integral cryptanalysis, algebraic attacks, and other attacks.
Introduction
Why do we need another block cipher? First of all, industry is still requesting; second, recent advances in the cryptanalysis field motivate new designs. The AES [1] and NESSIE [27] efforts, among others, have resulted in a number of new proposals of block ciphers. It is noteworthy that there exists a clear trend in direction of lightweight and fast key-schedule algorithms, as well as substitution boxes based on purely algebraic constructions. In a parallel way, we observe that, on the one hand, several of the last published attacks against block ciphers take often advantage of exploiting "simple" key-schedule algorithms (a nice illustration is certainly Muller's attack [24] against Khazad), and, on the other hand, algebraic S-boxes are helpful to Courtois-Pieprzyk algebraic attacks [8] , and lead to puzzling properties as shown by [2, 10, 25] .
In this paper, we describe the design of a new family of block cipher, named FOX and designed upon the request of MediaCrypt AG [23] . The main features of this design, besides a very high security level, are a large flexibility in terms of use and of implementation on various platforms, as well as high performances. The family consists in two block ciphers, one having a 64-bit block size and the other one a 128-bit block size. Each block cipher allows a variable number of rounds and a variable key size up to 256 bits. The high-level structure is based on a LaiMassey scheme, while the round functions consist of Substitution-Permutation Networks with no algebraic S-boxes. In addition, we propose a new design of strong and efficient key-schedule algorithms. Our main motivations are the following: our first goal is to offer a serious alternative to block ciphers following present trends; we have explicitely chosen to avoid a lightweight key-schedule and a pure algebraic construction as S-boxes. Our second goal is to reach the highest possible flexibility, being in terms of round number, key size, block size and in terms of implementation issues. For instance, we feel that it is still useful to propose a 64-bit block size flavour for backwardcompatibility reasons. Finally, our last motivation was to design a family of block ciphers which compares favourably with the performances of the fastest block ciphers on hardware, 8-bit, 32-bit, and 64-bit architectures. This paper is organized as follows: in §2, we give a formal description of the block ciphers, then we successively discuss the rationales in §3 the security foundations in §4 and several implementations aspects in §5. Test vectors are available in Appendix A. The full version of this paper is [14] . Notations: A variable x indexed by i with a length of bits is denoted x i( ) . A C-like notation is used for indexing i.e. indices begin with 0.
Representation of GF 2
8 : Some of the internal operations used in FOX are the addition and the multiplication in the GF(2 8 ) finite field. Elements of the field are polynomials with coefficients in GF(2) in α, a root of the irreducible polynomial P (α) = α 8 + α 7 + α 6 + α 5 + α 4 + α 3 + 1: the 8-bit binary string s = s 0(1) ||s 1(1) ||s 2(1) ||s 3(1) ||s 4(1) ||s 5(1) ||s 6(1) ||s 7(1) represents s 0(1)
Description
The different members of this block cipher family are denoted as follows: In FOX64/k/r and FOX128/k/r, the number r of rounds must satisfy 12 ≤ r ≤ 255, while the key length k must satisfy 0 ≤ k ≤ 256, with k multiple of 8. Note that a generic instance of FOX has 16 rounds.
High-Level Structure
The 64-bit version of FOX is the (r − 1)-times iteration of a round function lmor64, followed by the application of a slightly modified round function called lmid64. For decryption, we replace lmor64 by lmio64. The encryption C (64) by FOX64/k/r of a 64-bit plaintext P (64) is defined as
where RK (64r) = RK 0(64) ||RK 1(64) || . . . ||RK r−1(64) is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key K (k) (see §2.3). The decryption P (64) by FOX64/k/r of a 64-bit ciphertext C (64) is defined as
In the 128-bit version of FOX, we simply replace lmor64, lmid64, and lmio64 by elmor128, elmid128, and elmio128, respectively. lmor64, illustrated in Fig.  1(a) , is built as a Lai-Massey scheme [18, 19] combined with an orthomorphism 1 or, as described in [30] . This function transforms a 64-bit input X (64) split in two parts X (64) = X 0(32) ||X 1 (32) and a 64-bit round key RK (64) in a 64-bit output Y (64) = Y 0(32) ||Y 1 (32) as Y (64) = or X 0(32) ⊕ φ X 1(32) ⊕ φ with φ = f32 X 0(32) ⊕ X 1 (32) , RK (64) . lmid64 and lmio64 are defined like for lmor64 but for or, which is replaced by the identity function and io (the inverse of or), respectively. elmor128, illustrated in Fig. 1(b) , is built as an Extended Lai-Massey scheme combined with two orthomorphisms or. This function transforms a 128-bit input X (128) split in four parts X (128) = X 0(32) ||X 1(32) ||X 2(32) ||X 3(32) and a 128-bit round key
where φ L ||φ R = f64 F (64) , RK (128) . In elmid128, resp. elmio128, the two orthomorphisms or are replaced by two identity, resp. io functions. The orthomorphism or is a function taking a 32-bit input X (32) = X 0(16) ||X 1 (16) and returning a 32-bit output Y (32) = Y 0(16) ||Y 1 (16) which is in fact a one-round Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function; it is defined as
Definition of f32 and f64
The round function f32 builds the core of FOX64/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution part, denoted sigma4, a diffusion part, denoted mu4, and a round key addition part (see Fig. 2(a) ). Formally, the f32 function takes a 32-bit input X (32) , a 64-bit round key RK (64) = RK 0(32) ||RK 1 (32) and returns a 32-bit output
The function f64, building the core of FOX128/k/r, is very similar to f32 (see Fig. 2(b) ): it takes a 64-bit input X (64) , a 128-bit round key RK (128) = RK 0(64) ||RK 1(64) and returns
The mapping sigma4 (resp. sigma8) consists of 4 (resp. 8) parallel computations of a non-linear bijective mapping (see §3.1 for a description and the table in §B). The diffusive parts of f32 and f64, mu4 and mu8, consider an input
T over GF 2 8 and multiply it with a matrix to obtain an output vector of the same size. The two matrices are the following:
, and where 
The three different versions of the key-schedule algorithm are constituted of four main parts: a padding part, denoted P, expanding K (k) into ek bits, a mixing part, denoted M, a diversification part, denoted D, whose core consists mainly in a linear feedback shift register denoted LFSR, and finally, a non-linear part, denoted NLx, which is actually the only part which differs between the different versions: we denote the three variants NL64, NL64h and NL128. When ek = k, the P and M parts are omitted.
Definition of P. The P-part, taking ek and k as input, is a function expanding a bit string by ek−k 8
bytes; it concatenates the key K (k) with the first ek − k bits of a constant, pad, giving P KEY as output. The constant pad is defined as being the first 256 bits of the hexadecimal development of e − 2 = +∞ n=0
Definition of M. The M-part mixes the padded key P KEY with the help of a Fibonacci-like recursion. It takes as input a key P KEY with length ek (expressed in bits) seen as an array of 
and the DKEY RB (8) value (DKEY RB (16) ) is obtained by XORing the most (16) ), respectively. The remaining 16 (8) bits of the LFSR routine output are discarded. The stream of pseudo-random values is generated by a 24-bit linear feedback shift register, denoted LFSR. It takes two inputs: the total number of rounds r and the number of preliminary clockings. It is based on the following primitive polynomial of degree 24 over GF (2) :
The register is initially seeded with the value 0x6A||r (8) ||r (8) , where r (8) is expressed as an 8-bit value.
Definition of NL64, NL128, and NL64h. We describe here the NL64 and NL128 processes, respectively. Basically, the DKEY value passes through a substitution layer, made of four parallel sigma4 (sigma8) functions, a diffusion layer, made of four parallel mu4 (mu8) functions and a mixing layer called mix64 (mix128), respectively. Then, the constant pad [0...127] (pad [0...255] ) is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if k = ek. The result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 (128) bits using two exclusive-or operations and the resulting value is encrypted first with a lmor64 (elmor128) round function, where the subkey is the left half of the DKEY value and second by a lmid64 (elmid128) function, where the subkey is the right half of DKEY . The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit (128-bit) round key, respectively. Detailed descriptions may be found in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) , respectively. In the case of NL64h, the process is very similar than for NL128; the difference is that the sigma8 (mu8) functions are replaced by two concatenated sigma4 (mu4) functions, respectively, that mix128 is replaced by mix64h, and that one uses three lmor64 round functions, where the respective subkeys are the three left quarters of the DKEY value and a lmid64 function, where the subkey is the rightmost quarter of DKEY . The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit round key. Fig. 3(c) illustrates the NL64h process whose construction is similar to those of NL64 and of NL128.
Definition of mix64, mix64h and mix128. Given an input vector of four 32-bit values, denoted X = X 0(32) ||X 1(32) ||X 2(32) ||X 3(32) , the mix64 function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output vector denoted Y = Y 0(32) ||Y 1(32) ||Y 2(32) ||Y 3 (32) . More formally, mix64 is defined as Y i(32) = j =i X j(32) for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. The mix64h and mix128 functions use identical relations operating on 64-bit values.
Rationales

sbox Transformation and Linear Multipermutations
As outlined in the introduction, our primary goal was to avoid a purely algebraic construction for the S-box; a secondary goal was the possibility to implement it in a very efficient way on hardware using ASIC or FPGA technologies. The sbox function is a bijective non-linear mapping on 8-bit values. It consists of a Lai-Massey scheme with 3 rounds taking three different substitution boxes as round function; these "small" S-boxes are denoted S 1 , S 2 and S 3 , and their content is given in §B. The orthomorphism 2 or4 used in the Lai-Massey scheme is a single round of a 4-bit Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function. We describe now the generation process of the sbox transformation. First a set of three different candidates for small substitution boxes, each having a LP max and a DP max (with the common notations 3 [22] ) smaller than 2 −2 were pseudo-randomly chosen. Then, the candidate sbox mapping was evaluated and tested regarding its LP max and DP max values until a good candidate was found. The chosen sbox satisfy DP sbox max = LP sbox max = 2 −4 and its algebraic degree is equal to 6.
Both mu4 and mu8 are linear multipermutations. This kind of construction was early recognized as being optimal for which regards its diffusion properties [28, 29] . A linear application defined by a matrix A is a multipermutation if and only if det(A) = 0 and if the determinant of each submatrix of A is different of zero as well. It is well-known that linear multipermutations are equivalent to MDS linear codes (i.e. Maximum Distance Separable codes). Not all constructions are very efficient to implement, especially on low-end smartcard, which have usually very few available memory and computational power (see [15] ). In order to be efficiently implementable, the elements of the matrix, which are elements of GF(2 8 ), should be efficient to multiply to 4 .
Key-Schedule Algorithms
The FOX key-schedule algorithms were designed with several rationales in mind: first, the function, which depends on the block size, taking a key K and the round number r in output and returning r subkeys should be a cryptographic 2 The orthormorphism of the third round is omitted.
2 with · being the inner dot-product on GF (2) n , DP sbox max = max a =0,b DP sbox (a, b), and LP
The only really efficient operations are the addition, the multiplication by α and the division by α. Note that
pseudo-random, collision resistant and one-way function. Second, the sequence of subkeys should be generated in any direction without any complexity penalty. Third, all the bytes of M KEY should be randomized even when the key size is strictly smaller than ek. Finally, the key-schedule algorithm should resist relatedcipher attacks as described by Wu in [33] . We are convinced that "strong" key-schedule algorithms have significant advantages in terms of security, even if the price to pay is a smaller key agility; in the case of FOX, we believe that the time needed to compute the subkeys (about equal to the time needed to encrypt 6 blocks 5 of data) remains acceptable. The second central property of FOX key-schedule algorithms is ensured by the LFSR construction. The third property is ensured by our "Fibonacci-like" construction (which is a bijective mapping). Furthermore, M KEY is expanded by XORing constants depending on r and ek with no overlap on these constants sequences (this was checked experimentally). Finally, the fourth property is ensured by the dependency of the subkey sequence to the actual round number of the algorithm instance for which the sequence will be used.
Security Foundations
Luby-Rackoff-like Security
Although less popular than the Feistel scheme or SPN structures, the Lai-Massey scheme offers similar (super-) pseudorandomness and decorrelation inheritance properties, as was demonstrated by Vaudenay [30] . Note that we will indifferently use the term "Lai-Massey scheme" to denote both versions, as we can see the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as a Lai-Massey scheme 6 . From this point, we will make use of the following notation: given an orthomorphism o on a group (G, +) and given r functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f r on G, we note a r-rounds Lai-Massey scheme using the r functions and the orthomorphism by Λ o (f 1 , . . . , f r ). Then the following results are two Luby-Rackoff-like [21] results on the Lai-Massey scheme. We refer to [30, 31] for proofs thereof.
Theorem 1 1. Let f * 1 , f * 2 and f * 3 be three independent random functions uniformly distributed on a group (G, +). Let o be an orthomorphism on G. For any distinguisher 7 limited to d chosen plaintexts, where g = |G| denotes the cardinality of the group, between
) and a uniformly distributed random permutation c * , we have Adv(
. 5 In the case of FOX64 with keys strictly larger than 128 bit, it takes the time to encrypt 12 blocks of data. 6 We can prove this by swapping the two inner inputs and noting that the function (x, y) → or32(x)||or32(y) builds an orthomorphism 7 A distinguisher A is a probabilistic Turing machine with unlimited computational power. It has access to an oracle O and can send it a limited number of queries. At the end, the distinguisher must output "0" or "1". The advantage for distinguishing a random function f from a random function g is defined by Adv(f, g) = PrˆA O=f = 1˜− PrˆA O=g = 1˜˛.
2. If f 1 , . . . , f r are r ≥ 3 independent random functions on a group (G, +) of order g such that Adv(f i , f * i ) ≤ 2 for any adaptive distinguisher between f i and f * i limited to d queries for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and if o is an orthomorphism on G, we have Adv(
Basically, the first result proves that the Lai-Massey scheme provides pseudorandomness on three rounds unless the f i 's are weak , like for the Feistel scheme [9] . Super-pseudorandomness corresponds to cases where a distinguisher can query chosen ciphertexts as well; in this scenario, the previous result holds when we consider Λ o (f * 1 , . . . , f * 4 ) with a fourth round. The second result proves that the decorrelation bias of the round functions of a Lai-Massey scheme is inherited by the whole structure: provided the f i 's are strong, so is the Lai-Massey scheme 8 ; in other words, a potential cryptanalysis will not be able to exploit the Lai-Massey's scheme only, but it will have to take advantage of weaknesses of the round functions' internal structure.
Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis
It is possible to prove some important results about the security of both f32 and f64 functions towards linear and differential cryptanalysis, too. As these functions may be viewed as classical Substitution-Permutation Network constructions, we will refer to some well-known results on their resistance towards linear and differential cryptanalysis proved in [12] by Hong et al. As the mu4 (mu8) mapping is a (4, 4)-multipermutation ( (8, 8)-multipermutation), one is ensured that at least n d = 5 (n d = 9) S-boxes before and after mu4 will be active, respectively. Then, by Theorem 1 of [12] , we have DP f32 max ≤ (DP sbox max ) 4 and DP f64 max ≤ (DP sbox max ) 8 . Similar results can be obtained with respect to linear cryptanalysis. By taking into account the fact that in a Lai-Massey scheme, any differential or linear characteristic on two rounds must involve at least one round function, we obtain the following result; its complete proof can be found in [14] .
Theorem 2
The differential (resp. linear) probability of any single-path characteristic in FOX64/k/r is upper bounded by (DP Since DP sbox max = LP sbox max = 2 −4 , we conclude that it is impossible to find any useful differential or linear characteristic after 8 rounds for both FOX64 and FOX128. Hence, a minimal number of 12 rounds provides a minimal safety margin.
Integral Attacks
Integral attacks [17] apply to ciphers operating on well-aligned data, like SPN structures. As the round functions of FOX are SPNs, one can wonder whether it is possible to find an integral distinguisher on the whole structure. We consider now the case of FOX64: let us denote the input bytes by X i(8) with 0 ≤ i ≤ 7. Let X 3(8) = a, X 7(8) = a ⊕ c, and X i(8)
i+4 (8) for 0 ≤ i ≤ 3. Note that we have still two such equalities if we replace the last round by a lmor64 round. This integral distinguisher 9 can be used to break (four, five) six rounds of FOX64 (by guessing the one, two, or three last round keys and testing the integral criterion for each subkey candidate on a few structures of plaintexts) with a complexity of about (2 64 , 2 128 ) 2 192 operations. A similar property may be used to break up to 4 rounds of FOX128 (by guessing the last round key) with a complexity of about 2 128 operations.
Other Attacks
Statistical Attacks. Due to the very high diffusion properties of FOX's round functions, the high algebraic degree of the sbox mapping, and the high number of rounds, we are strongly convinced that FOX will resist to known variants of linear and differential cryptanalysis (like differential-linear cryptanalysis [4, 20] , boomerang [32] and rectangle attacks [5] ), as well as generalizations thereof, like Knudsen's truncated and higher-order differentials [16] , impossible differentials [3] , and Harpes' partitioning cryptanalysis [11] , for instance.
Slide and Related-Key Attacks. Slide attacks [6, 7] exploit periodic key-schedule algorithms, which is not a property of FOX's key-schedule algorithms. Furthermore, due to very good diffusion and the high non-linearity of the key-schedule, related-key attacks are very unlikely to be effective against FOX.
Interpolation and Algebraic Attacks. Interpolation attacks [13] take advantage of S-boxes exhibiting a simple algebraic structure. Since FOX's non-linear mapping sbox does not possess any simple relation over GF (2) or GF(2 8 ), such attacks are certainly not effective. One of our main concerns was to avoid a pure algebraic construction for the sbox mapping, as it is the case for a large number of modern designs of block ciphers. Although such S-boxes have many interesting non-linear properties, they probably form the best conditions to express a block cipher as a system of sparse, over-defined low-degree multivariate polynomial equations over GF (2) or GF (2 8 ); this fact may lead to effective attacks, as argued by Courtois and Pieprzyk in [8] . Not choosing an algebraic construction for sbox does not necessarily ensure security towards algebraic attacks. Note that we base our non-linear mapping on "small" permutations, mapping 4 bits to 4 bits, and that, according to [8] , any such mapping can always be written as an overdefined system of at least 21 quadratic equations. Indeed, we checked that S 1 , S 2 , and 9 Note that one could extend it to four rounds using large precomputed tables, and thus reduce the overall complexity by a factor of 2 64 . S 3 cannot be described by a system with more than 21 quadratic equations over GF (2) ; furthermore, we are not aware of any quadratic relation over GF 2 8 for sbox. Following the very same methodology than [8] , it appears that XSL attacks would break members of the FOX family within a complexity 10 of 2 171 to 2 192 , depending on the block size and the round numbers. However, one should interpret these figures with an extreme care: on the one hand, the real complexity of XSL attacks is by no means clear at the time of writing and is the subject of much controversy [26] ; on the other hand, we feel that the advantages of a small hardware footprint overcome such a (possible) security decrease.
Implementation Issues
Hardware. The size of the small S-boxes allows to implement FOX very efficiently on hardware using ASIC or FPGA technologies (which can usually implement any 4-bit to 4-bit mapping very efficiently). Projects are currently in process. We expect that FOX results in very high performances on hardware.
8-bit Platforms. Obviously, the most intensive computations are related to the evaluation of the sbox mapping and of mu4 and mu8. Different strategies may be applied: when extremely few memory is available, one computes on-the-fly the sbox mapping, as it is described in §3.1, and all the operations in GF 2 8 . The sole needed constants are the small substitution boxes S 1 , S 2 and S 3 (see §B) and the constants needed by the key-schedule algorithm. A significant speed gain can be obtained if one precomputes the sbox mapping, the finite field operations being all computed dynamically. A third possibility is to precompute two more mappings: multiplication in GF 2 8 by α and by α −1 . Finally, in the case of FOX128, a further speed gain may be obtained by tabulating two more mappings: multiplication by α 2 and by α −2 .
32/64-bit Platforms. The f32 and f64 functions can be implemented very efficiently using a classical combinations of 
Conclusion
Obviously, proposing a new block cipher family leads to new open problems. We strongly encourage the development of attacks against full or reduced versions of any member of the FOX family.
Another very interesting open problem is the definition of new linear multipermutations which can be implemented efficiently on low-cost 8-bit smartcards. Some proposals have been done in connection with the design of block ciphers based on SPNs, where the inverse multipermutation also has to be implemented; using them in a self-inverting structure, e.g. a Feistel or a Lai-Massey scheme, allows to relax this condition. Hence, the linear mapping can be optimized 0x0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210 are given for two different key lengths, for FOX64 and FOX128, respectively.
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B sbox Definition
The three small S-boxes S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 , as well as the full S-box, are defined in the following tables:
x 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7 0x8 0x9 0xA 0xB 0xC 0xD 0xE 0xF S1(x) 0x2 0x5 0x1 0x9 0xE 0xA 0xC 0x8 0x6 0x4 0x7 0xF 0xD 0xB 0x0 0x3 S2(x) 0xB 0x4 0x1 0xF 0x0 0x3 0xE 0xD 0xA 0x8 0x7 0x5 0xC 0x2 0x9 0x6 S3(x) 0xD 0xA 0xB 0x1 0x4 0x3 0x8 0x9 0x5 0x7 0x2 0xC 0xF 0x0 0x6 0xE
One should read the next table in that way: to compute sbox(0x4C), one selects first the row named 4. (i.e. the fifth row), and then one selects the column named .C (i.e. the thirteenth column) and we get finally sbox(0x4C) = 0x15. 
